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Abstract of Comment  
Suboptimality of decision making needs no explanation. High level accounts of suboptimality 
in diverse tasks cannot add up to a mechanistic theory of perceptual decision making. Mental 
processes operate on the contents of information brought by the experimenter and the 
participant to the task, not on the amount of information in the stimuli without regard to 
physical and social context.   
 
 Main Text of Comment  
 
Belief in Bayesian optimality is an example of recurring efforts to escape from the study of 
basic mechanisms into a world of ideals. Reality takes its revenge as more and more 
departures from ideal are found and attempts to explain them are refuted or forced into extra 
detail, as Rahnev and Denison (R&D) show.  
 
Departures from optimality do not need explaining nor can they illuminate mechanisms of 
perceptual performance. The Bayesian programme fails to reckon with Claude Shannon’s 
insistence that the quantity of information tells us nothing about what the information 
contains (Shannon & Weaver, 1949).  Success or failure at meeting a criterion of optimal use 
of the amount of information in experimenter’s stimuli is irrelevant to what is actually going 
on in making a perceptual decision. First, any experiment is rich in information of which 
optimality calculations take no account. Crucial contextual information is explicit as physical 
arrangements and social signals such as verbal instructions, and implicit in the cultural and 
material memory that the individual participant brings to each response. Second, the 
contextual information contents can make some of the content of the experimenter’s stimuli 
dispensable for the perceptual decision. Hence, calculations that do not take context into 
account can yield an illusory suboptimality. In fact, a substantial number of participants use 
the whole of the information that each processes from the present and past (e.g., Booth, 
Sharpe, Freeman & Conner, 2011; Booth, Freeman, Konle, Wainright & Sharpe, 2011). 
 
R&D identify individuality as one source of suboptimality.  Far more than that, disregard of 
individuality prevents mechanistic understanding. Every perceptual decision is determined by 
an individual’s use of information contained in the cultural and material environment of the 
test. This causal mediation is the transient structure in discrimination-scaled distances 
between the individual’s present and past output/input values (Booth & Freeman, 1993; 
Booth, Sharpe, Freeman & Conner, 2011). The processed information content varies across 
individuals and circumstances, and even between particular occasions of the same situation in 
the same person. Therefore, raw data from individuals should never be averaged before 
testing a mechanistic hypothesis (Booth & Freeman, 1993; Conner, Haddon, Pickering & 
Booth, 1988; Booth, 2017), as is now becoming more widely acknowledged (e.g., Luce, 
2013). The standard observer models sought by R&D also neglect the idiosyncrasies of 
information content in the actual mechanisms of perceptual decision making. 
 
Many of results cited by R&D indicate that physical stimuli and context provided by the 
investigators interacts with social context brought by the participant. One of the paradigms 
reviewed by R&D is psychophysical judgment. In the usual design, the experimenter uses 
one of a pair of stimuli as a standard of comparison with the other stimulus which is varied. 
In fact, each stimulus presentation, whether test or standard, is compared with memory of 
previous stimuli. The comparative decision is determined by the difference in distances of 
test and standard from memory of previous exposures in a similar context (e.g., Booth & 
Freeman, 1993; Stewart, Brown & Chater, 2005). The standard stimulus is at best redundant 
and may even be a source of range-frequency bias (Poulton, 1988; cp., Conner, Land & 
Booth, 1987, and Booth, 2016).  
 
In other words, the experimenter’s standard is part of the physical context for the test 
stimulus on which the perceptual decision is supposedly made. Far from the memory of the 
first stimulus decaying, as R&D cite, long term memory is updated at each presentation. That 
is how pre-treatment with a high incidence of positive stimuli reduces a bias to making 
negative responses, also cited by R&D. Accurate diagnosis of the causal structure of a session 
of perceptual decisions depends on personal tailoring of stimulus levels to be balanced 
around the familiar level within the range of Weber fraction constancy (Conner, Haddon, 
Pickering & Booth, 1988; Booth, Freeman, Konle et al., 2011; Booth, Higgs, Schneider et al., 
2010).  
 
R&D review a number of the paradigms showing effects of social context, disguised as 
personality score. Personality inventories are designed to obscure differences in behaviour 
between situations to create a stable trait, but they vary with state to unknown extents. To 
permit mechanistic analysis, each relevant social signal has to be presented at two or more 
levels, unconfounded with other signals within a session. For example, anxiety about being a 
lying witness in a detection task might be manipulated by the experimenter indicating that 
some stimuli test for absence of the signal.   
 
Confidence ratings merely express optimistic behaviour or other habits, rather than giving 
introspective access to mechanisms of perception. Whether the causation is conscious or 
unconscious, the only access is through output-input relationships placed on a universal scale 
of discrimination between present and past. 
 
R&W discuss the variations in trade off between speed and accuracy in reaction times 
induced by direct instructions or time limits on massed tests, without considering these 
designs as social pressures.  If stimuli provided more scope for using past experience, then 
the mechanisms of interaction with social context could be investigated. For example, 
conventional demands for a fast decision or a correct answer could be presented at different 
levels. 
 
Similarly, deficiencies in signal detection cited by R&D could be reduced by more ecological 
validity of the random background provided for the test signal.  If a familiar enough context 
were provided throughout, the variance of the response distribution would less likely be 
higher in the presence of the signal. Furthermore, the line of investigation could be relevant 
to theoretical and practical issues in such contexts (Booth, 2015).  
 
R&D review evidence that improper perceptual criteria and supposed misweightings in cue 
combinations account for suboptimality. If the experiments were designed to be analogues of 
familiar real life scenarios, personally relevant content of the cues could be tested as 
mechanisms to explain performance.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that effect of unidentified contextual factors can be measured from 
the individual’s causal structure of discrimination scaled content in a session of tests.  First, 
the most successful combination of known output/input relationships may account for 
substantially less than the total variance in the perceptual response. Second, the 
discrimination distances between present and past of observed features of the situation may 
not interpolate through the zero from the past.  The eccentricity measures the contextual 
defect in discrimination units or response quantity (Booth et al., 2011). 
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